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NOTES & COMMENTS 
PEACE BONDS: PREVENTIVE JUSTICE? 
OR PREVENTING JUSTICE? 
PETER M. NEUMANNt 
In this comment1 I wish to examine some of the legal and practical 
problems with "peace bond" proceedings under s. 810 of the 
Criminal Code2 for women who seek to protect themselves from 
their abusive partners. Recent research confirms that women are 
most likely to suffer violence at the hands of men they have known 
intimately and that they are especially vulnerable at the time of 
separation. A 1991 study funded by the Ontario Women's 
Directorate and the Ontario Ministry of Community and Social 
Services,3 for example, found that "intimate femicides"-or the 
killing of women by their intimate partners4-accounted for some 
61 percent of all homicides of women where an offender was 
identified. In sharp contrast, only eight percent of all male victims 
were killed by their spouses.5 Women separating or recently 
estranged from their partners were at the greatest risk, homicide 
t B. Appl. Sc. (Toronto), LLB. anitcipated 1994 (Dalhousie). 
1 I would like to thank Professor Rollie Thompson, Faculty of Law, 
Dalhousie University, for reviewing a draft of this paper and for providing me 
with many helpful comments. 
2 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
3 M. Crawford & R. Gartner, Woman Killing: Intimate Femicide in Ontario, 
1974-1990 (Toronto: Women We Honour Action Committee, 1992). 
4 An intimate partner was defined as a legal or common-law spouse, or a 
boyfriend, whether current or estranged. Ibid. at 27. 
5 Note this figure refers to killings by legal or common-law spouses only, and 
not other intimate female partners. It is thus arguably a narrower definition than 
that of "intimate partner" used in the intimate femicide study. Nonetheless, a 
strict numerical comparison of spouse killings (in Ontario) reveals that, of the 
total 558 spouse killings between 1974 and 1990, women were victims in 75 
percent of the cases. Ibid. at 34. 
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being significantly more likely to occur at this time than at other 
times during the relationship.6 
The results of the Ontario intimate femicide study are sup-
ported by a recent Statistics Canada survey on assault against 
women.7 Of 12,300 women interviewed, more than 50 percent re-
vealed that they had been assaulted, physically or sexually, at least 
once in their lives.8 Again, this violence was found most likely to 
occur at the hands of an intimate partner: almost half (forty-five 
percent) of those interviewed said their assaulters were dates, 
boyfriends, husbands, friends or family members.9 
The peace bond is one legal remedy that has been held out to 
battered women in the hope of providing them with some protec-
tion from their assailants. 1° Found under s. 810 of the Criminal Code 
6 Ibid. at vii and at 166. See also L. Macleod, Battered But Not 
Beaten . .. Preventing Wife Battering in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory 
Council on the Status of Women, 1987) at 44; J. Abell, "Women, Violence, and the 
Criminal Law: It's the Fundamentals of Being a Lawyer that are at Stake Here" 
(1992) 17 Queen's L.J. 147 note 35 at 161. 
7 "50% of Women Report Assaults: Ground-breaking Statscan survey finds 
violence pervasive" The Globe and Mail (l 9 November 1993) Al, A4. 
8 Ibid. Sexual and physical assault were defined consistent with the legal 
definitions of these offences, and included both threats and acts of violence 
ranging from pushing or shoving to the use of weapons to inflict harm. 
9 Ibid. Despite this high incidence of violence, just 14 percent of all the 
incidents catalogued by the survey were reported to the police. Some 22 percent of 
those women assaulted said they had never even mentioned the assault to anyone 
else. 
lO Other remedies include civil restraining orders, available under provincial 
law statutes such as Ontario's Family Law ActS.O. 1986, c. 4, s. 46 and British 
Columbia's Family Relations Act R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 121, s. 36.1 which permit 
provincial or superior court judges, on application, to make orders restraining 
persons (in Ontario, spouses) from "molesting, annoying or harassing [and, in 
B.C., also communicating with] the applicant" or the applicant's children; the 
court may also require the person named in the order to sign a recognizance, with 
or without sureties, with such conditions as the court considers appropriate. 
While Ontario's Act makes it an "offence" to contravene a restraining order, the 
penalty for which is a fine of up to $5,000 or imprisonment for three months (or 
both), and grants police officers the power to arrest without a warrant on 
"reasonable and probable grounds," the jurisdiction of the court only extends to 
married couples or couples who have cohabited "continuously for a period of not 
less than three years" [s. 29(a)] or in a "relationship of some permanence, if they 
are the natural or adoptive parents of a child" [s. 29(b)]. B.C.'s Act does not create 
an offence but has no marital or other relationship restrictions. See infra notes 
39-46 and accompanying text. 
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under the heading "Sureties to Keep the Peace," this remedy has a 
simple three-part structure. Under s. 810(1): 
Any person who fears that another person will cause per-
sonal injury to him or his spouse or child or will damage 
his property may lay an information before a justice. 
Once such an information has been sworn, s. 810(2) stipulates: 
A justice who receives an information under subsection 
(1) shall cause the parties to appear before him or before a 
summary conviction court having jurisdiction in the same 
territorial division. 
Section 810(3) then sets out the evidentiary requirements at this 
hearing and the remedial powers of a judge if these requirements are 
met: 
The justice or the summary conviction court before which 
the parties appear may, if satisfied by the evidence 
adduced that the informant has reasonable grounds for his 
fears, 
(a) order that the defendant enter into a recognizance, 
with or without sureties, to keep the peace and be of 
good behaviour for any period that does not exceed 
twelve months, and comply with such other conditions 
prescribed in the recognizance as the court considers 
desirable for securing the good conduct of the defen -
dant; or 
(b) commit the defendant to prison for a term not ex-
ceeding twelve months if he fails or refuses to enter into 
the recognizance. 
It should be noted that the vires of these sections, which grant provincial court 
judges jurisdiction (concurrently with superior court judges) to issue restraining 
orders, has never been challenged, either on the grounds that the sections 
unconstitutionally invade the exclusive jurisdiction of s. 96 courts, or because 
they are invalid as legislation falling within the federal criminal law power in 
s. 91 (27) of the Constitution Act, 1867. On the other hand, provisions purporting 
to give provincial court judges jurisdiction in ordering exclusive occupancy of a 
residence or home have been challenged and held to be ultra vires on the grounds 
that they confer upon a provincial court a jurisdiction reserved to s. 96 courts 
alone. See Rudderham v. Rudderham (1988), 85 N.S.R. (2d) 267 (C.A.); Reference 
Re 5.6 of the Family Relations Act, 1978, [1982] I S.C.R. 62. 
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Although part of the Criminal Code, s. 810 nevertheless has sev-
eral features which sets it apart from most other criminal proceed-
ings. Unlike other informations, for example, a s. 810 information 
does not allege the commission of any offence. 11 Moreover, unlike 
orders made under most penalty provisions of the Criminal Code, an 
order against a defendant under s. 810(3)(a) is not a conviction 
resulting in a sentence. 12 Instead of punishing an offender for a past 
offence, s. 810 aims to prevent the defendant from breaching the 
peace in the future. 13 It is this unique preventive function that has led 
some judges to refer to s. 810 as a codification of the ancient 
common law power of "preventive justice"14 which granted justices 
11 Indeed, in Re Patricia E. Moses (1980), 5 W.C.B. 270 (Man. C.A.), the court 
noted that a s. 810 information must not allege that an offence has been 
committed or the information may be considered defective and quashed. Where 
an offence is alleged the proper procedure to follow is to lay an information in 
respect of that offence. 
On the other hand, some courts have held that s. 810 informations must comply 
to some extent with the requirements for informations under s. 581 of the 
Criminal Code, viz., an information must contain sufficient details of the 
circumstances to give the defendant reasonable information concerning the 
allegation. In Re William Boyko (1978), 2 W.C.B. 341 (Ont. Prov. Ct.) the court 
held that an information which merely alleges that the informant fears that the 
defendant will cause personal injury to him or her does not comply with s. 581 
and is incapable of amendment and therefore must be quashed. 
Similarly, in Regina v. Leslie Thoen (1984), 11 W.C.B. 468 (Sask. Un. Fam. Ct.) 
the court held that where the information fails to allege any particular instances 
to show the basis of the complainant's fears, the information is a nullity in 
breaching s. 581 (3) and cannot be cured by particulars. 
The difficulty that might arise here is where the informant does not wish to 
charge the defendant with an offence-such as assault-but must rely on such an 
incident to support her information for a peace bond. Some justices of the peace 
automatically prefer to lay assault charges wherever the facts alleged by an 
informant could support such charges even where the informant is merely seeking 
a peace bond. 
12 See Rv. Manette, [1987] N.S.J. No. 308 (QL); R. v. S., [1992] B.C.J. No. 738 
(QL); R. v. Patrick (1990), 75 C.R. (3d) 222 [hereinafter Patrick]. 
13 Defendants who do not, however, can be charged under s. 811 with "breach of 
recognizance," an offence punishable on summary conviction. 
14 See e.g. Stevenson v. Saskatchewan (Minister of justice) (1987) 61 Sask. R. 91 
(Q.B.)[hereinafrer Stevenson]; R. v. Chester, [1991] B.C.J. No. 2881 (QL). In 
Stevenson, at 93 this prerogative power was described thus: 
Common law preventive justice is an English concept so 
ancient that its origins are now obscure. It empowers justices to 
place a person under a bond where it appears the person may be a 
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the power to bind those persons over to the peace "whom there is a 
probable ground to suspect of future misbehaviour."15 
At first blush then, s. 810 would seem well-suited to the needs 
of women who wish to protect themselves from their batterers 
without taking the additional step and charging them formally with 
an offence. In a sense, s. 810 offers a middle-ground approach: the 
abusive partner is warned and given a second chance without being 
subjected to the full reprimand of the criminal law. By forming a 
part of the Criminal Code, however, the section retains the important 
symbolic function played by the criminal law in shaping society's 
values and effecting social change. 16 This "softer" approach may be 
threat to the peace, regardless of the fact the person has 
committed no offence. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has recently indicated, however, that this 
sweeping power may not survive a Charter challenge. In R. v. Parks (1992), 75 
C.C.C. (3d) 287 at 313-314, Sopinka, J. for the majority states: 
[T]he extent and continued validity of this common law power 
has yet to be considered in light of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms. Restrictions on an individual's liberty 
can only be effected in accordance with principles of 
fundamental justice or must be satisfied under s. 1. This 
applies to deprivations of liberty following a criminal 
conviction as well as those effected in other circumstances .... I 
have grave doubts as to whether a power that can be exercised on 
the basis of "probable ground[s] to suspect future 
misbehaviour" without limits as to the type of "misbehaviour" 
or potential victims, would survive Charter scrutiny. If such a 
power allowed the imposition of restrictive conditions 
following an acquittal on the basis of a remote possibility of 
recurrence, it may well be contrary to s. 7. 
It should be noted that the facts in R. v. Parks that gave rise to the discussion of 
common law powers to bind persons over to the peace were substantially different 
from those ordinarily arising in peace bond proceedings between spouses. In R. v. 
Parks, the defendant had been acquitted of murdering his mother-in-law through 
the defence of non-insane automatism caused by sleepwalking. Lamer, C.J.C. 
(Cory, J. concurring) argued (unsuccessfully) that the matter should be referred 
back to the trial judge who, through his or her common law power of preventive 
justice, could order appropriate conditions to be placed on the defendant's release 
in order to prevent the recurrence of the tragic events in this case. 
15 Blackstone, vol. 4 at 251, as cited in R. Hunter, "Common Law Peace Bonds: 
The Power of Justices of the Peace to Administer 'Preventive Justice'" (1978) 1 
C.R. (3d) 70 at 85. 
l6 See L. Macleod, supra note 6 at 78, who writes: 
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important to many women who, as studies show, 17 are often 
reluctant to become involved in criminal proceedings and fre-
quently choose not to report incidents of assault to the police. 18 
In practice, however, the peace bond has proved to be neither as 
"preventive" nor as "just" as it has been held out to be. 19 Studies 
One of the most important roles the criminal justice system 
plays in our society is a symbolic one, through which it 
reflects, and may help promote, emerging values. It also 
symbolizes what we as a society will tolerate and what is 
beyond tolerance. It is this function, more than its correctional 
or punitive functions, which has given the criminal justice 
system such potential to be an important ally in promoting 
change in societal attitudes and responses to wife battering. 
17 "50% of Women ... pervasive," supra note 7. 
I 8 Ibid. As one American director of a project measuring the effectiveness of 
restraining orders notes, victims often are unwilling or unable to endure the 
strain of maintaining a firm position throughout a lengthy and often 
intimidating criminal process. See G. R. Brown, "Battered Women and the 
Temporary Restraining Order" (1988) 10 W.R.L.R. 261 at 264. Macleod, in her 
study Battered But Not Beaten, supra note 6 at 85, observes that "women are most 
positive about criminal justice intervention when the criminal justice system is 
seen as a preventive and protective, rather than a punitive, system." 
19 M. Crawford & R. Gartner, supra note 3 at 166. Just a few of the more recent 
examples of women murdered or seriously injured by men who were at the time 
subject to peace bonds or restraining orders are: Terri-Lyn Babb in Manitoba, 
killed by a man after she had rebuffed his offer of romance (Canadian Press, 23 
January 1993); Daisy Jean Jefferson of Digby, Nova Scotia, strangled by her 
husband who later died himself in the blaze he set to cover up her death 
(Canadian Press, 30 July 1993); Tracy Evans, shot twice in the head by her 
husband, a prominent Calgary lawyer (Canadian Press, 29 January 1993); 
Marilyn Jensen, hacked to death in 1991 in Winnipeg by her former boyfriend 
(Ibid.); and Lorraine Mills of Nova Scotia, stabbed to death in April 1992 by her 
estranged husband (Canadian Press, 24 January 1993). 
This has led some groups, such as the Federal/Provincial/Territorial 
Working Group of Attorneys General Officials on Gender Equality in the 
Canadian Justice System, to consider overhauling the current peace bond process 
if not replacing it entirely with other more effective measures. As the authors 
note, "[i]t may be that the Criminal Code is not the appropriate vehicle for this 
application, or that legislative or policy changes are required to expedite the 
process." One reform that has been recommended by both the Uniform Law 
Conference of Canada and the Law Reform Commission of Canada is that police 
officers be given the power to release arrested persons on conditions. As noted by 
the authors, "this option provides more scope for the police to remove the 
offender from the home and reinforce protection for women and children by 
adding a no-contact condition." See Background Papers and the Proposals for 
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examining restraining type orders indicate an inverse relationship 
between preventive effectiveness and the severity or frequency of 
prior abuse: the greater the history of violence in the relationship, in 
other words, the less likely restraining orders will have any signifi-
cant effect deterring subsequent violence.20 Equally, while restrain-
ing orders appear to have some effectiveness in curtailing verbal 
abuse, harassment and physical violence for women whose prior in-
juries were not severe, researchers have found that many women who 
begin the process of obtaining a restraining order give up before 
they actually get one.21 
My own experience as a clinical law student22 representing a 
battered woman23 indicates that there are still many obstacles to 
obtaining a peace bond in Canada. Broadly speaking, informants 
face obstacles of both a procedural or substantive (interpretive) na-
ture. Procedures safeguarding the rights of defendants in ordinary 
criminal proceedings often cause unjustifiable delays when im-
ported wholesale into peace bond proceedings: while appropriate, 
perhaps, in the former context, complicated and lengthy procedures 
do not address the urgent situation faced by many battered women. 
This situation is exacerbated by the reluctance of many courts to 
consider any sort of interim protection for the informant where the 
defendant contests the information or is unrepresented and 
unprepared to defend himself. Furthermore, while Family Courts 
are generally preferable to Criminal Courts in peace bond 
proceedings, restrictive statutory requirements and court intake 
policies with respect to the relationship of the informant and de-
fendant may prevent many women from applying for a peace bond 
Action by Attorneys General to Promote Gender Equality in the Canadian justice 
System, prepared by this group in April 1992 and released July 5, 1993. 
20 J. L. Grau, "Restraining Order Legislation for Battered Women: A 
Reassessment" (1982) 16 U.S.F.L. Rev. 703 at 732, citing a study done by J. Fagan, 
E. Friedman, D. Stewart & V. Lewis, The National Family Violence Evaluation: 
Final Report (1982). 
21 Gary Richard Brown, the director of the Yale Temporary Restraining 
Order (T.R.0.) Project for Battered Women, estimates that about 70 percent of 
the Project's clients who begin the T.R.O. process drop out before obtaining a 
permanent protective order. See G. R. Brown, Battered Women and the Temporary 
Restraining0rder(1988) 10 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 261at263, n. 26. 
22 At Dalhousie Legal Aid Service, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova 
Scotia, September to December, 1993. 
23 I will refer to this client and her experience obtaining a peace bond at other 
points throughout this comment. 
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in Family Court. Given the public, often intimidating environment 
of most Criminal Courts, women who might otherwise seek a peace 
bond in Family Court may choose not to do so in Criminal Court. 
Similarly, obstacles to obtaining peace bonds may arise through 
overly restrictive interpretations of the substantive and evidentiary 
requirements of s. 810. Many courts, for example, place too high a 
burden of proof on the complainant to show her fears are reasonable; 
similarly, courts may define too narrowly the type of abusive or 
threatening conduct which will ground relief. Either way, the effect 
is to reduce access to peace bonds. 
Of course, while procedural protections and presumptions in 
favour of accused persons are clearly important in criminal proceed-
ings where the defendant faces conviction and/or incarceration, they 
must be re-examined in light of the unique preventive and non-
punitive nature of s. 810 itself and the risk faced by informants-in 
particular, battered women-who are denied the protection of this 
remedy. 
I. PROCEDURAL OBSTACLES 
1. Forum: Family Court vs. Criminal Court 
Most common-law provinces in Canada have established separate 
Family Courts with jurisdiction24 to hear family law matters in-
cluding certain Criminal Code offences or informations between 
married or common-law spouses.25 In Nova Scotia, for example, 
women who wish to obtain a peace bond against a spouse can apply 
to the Family Court or the provincial court for a hearing.26 While, 
of course, both courts are dealing with the same provisions of the 
Criminal Code, in fact there may be significant advantages for bat-
tered women who can apply through the Family Court. Family 
Courts, which are generally closed to the public, for example, usu-
ally present a far less intimidating environment than that found in 
24 This jurisdiction may be held concurrently by other provincial courts. 
25 Under s. 7(3) of the Nova Scotia Family Court Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 159, for 
example, the Governor in Council has the power to confer on the Family Court 
jurisdiction over certain Criminal Code offences or matters, including under 
ss. (3)(e), "sections 810 and 811 where the parties are husband and wife or parent 
and child." 
26 Subject to certain statutory definitional limitations and Family Court 
policies discussed infra at notes 39-48. 
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most Criminal Courts. Family court intake officers, moreover, are 
often more responsive to the needs of battered women than are 
criminal court justices of the peace and will take a greater pro-
active role in assisting battered women throughout the peace bond 
process. 27 Family Court officers are also generally more aware of 
the availability of auxiliary support services which will provide 
women in need with shelter, counselling and other urgent necessities. 
Similarly, Family Court judges, who have more training and 
experience in dealing with criminal family law matters than crimi-
nal court judges, are generally more sensitive to the broader socio-
logical and practical realities of spousal abuse28 and frequently 
adopt a more interventionist approach.29 One important manifes-
27 At Halifax Family Court, for example, the intake officer Sarah Osborne 
informs me that she will conduct a private interview with applicants and run 
through a "security check": this includes such things as ascertaining whether the 
applicant currently has shelter or whether her locks have been changed at her 
home. The intake officer will also assist the applicant in swearing an 
information for a peace bond if she so wishes. Telephone interview with Sarah 
Osborne (10 January 1994). 
Criminal court justices of the peace, on the other hand, are often less likely to 
believe an informant and will set the test for swearing a peace bond information 
higher than is required ins. 810. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. 
28 While this is generally true, it is of course not necessarily true. A recent 
editorial, "Injudicious Remarks" The Globe and Mail (IO December 1993), 
reviewed several well-publicized examples of comments made by some of the 
more outspoken provincial court judges on our benches in Canada: 
In 1987, the Nova Scotia cabinet fired a provincial [Family 
Court] judge who commonly advised women to follow the 
Bible's teachings and be subservient to their husbands, even if 
their husbands abused them. In 1989, a Manitoba judge 
apologized after saying during a domestic assault case that, 
"Sometimes a slap in the face is all that she needs." In 1990, 
during an assault and weapons trial in a Montreal suburb, a 
senior judge said that rules are like women: they are meant to 
be violated. 
This editorial was prompted by the Quebec judge who, in response to a wife's 
fears that her husband would kill her if released, replied: "If the gentleman 
assassinates the lady I won't lose any sleep over it and I won't die. Don't worry I 
won't suffer from depression either, because it is not my responsibility." See 
"Quebec judge's remarks keep courts in spotlight" The Globe and Mail (9 
December 1993) A3. 
29 See e.g. the decision of Niedermeyer, J .F.C. in D.L.K v. JJB., (30 January 
1991), Dartmouth DM91-0023 (N.S. Fam. Ct.) where a restraining type 
"protective order" was made against a violent husband pursuant to the Family 
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tation of this sensitivity is a greater likelihood on the part of 
Family Court judges, where peace bond hearings are contested, to 
apply the judicial interim release provisions of the Criminal Code at 
the first hearing of a s. 810 information, although broad authority 
for this procedure is still in its legal infancy.30 Rather than simply 
adjourning the matter for the subsequent hearing on the merits with-
out considering the implications for the informant in the interim, 
the defendant is asked to agree to sign an undertaking pursuant to s. 
515(2)(a) of the Criminal Code (Judicial Interim Release), usually 
to stay away from the complainant until the matter comes before 
the court again for adjudication. Where the defendant is unrepre-
sented and unprepared to agree to this, some Family Court judges 
have adopted the practice of warning the defendant or demanding 
that the defendant give a verbal undertaking to stay away from the 
informant.31 In order to ensure that this verbal promise does not go 
unchecked, the intake officer of the court will see that a defendant 
who has breached his promise is brought before the same judge who 
issued the warning. 32 
This sort of interim protective relief is crucial for many 
battered women who may be in the first stages of separating from 
their partners and who may thus doubly invite retaliation,33 once for 
Maintenance Act although the Act provided for no such power expressly; rather, 
the court found jurisdiction through a parens patriae jurisdiction derived in 
turn from s. 18(5) of the Act which states that, in any proceeding concerning care 
and custody or access in respect to a child, "the welfare of the child is the 
paramount consideration." The judge then stated: 
Regrettably, too often we hear in the general public and media 
horrendous tales of separated couples whereby one of the parties 
becomes so irrational that they violently strike back at the other 
partner, even to the point of taking that person's life. 
Some feminist critics would take issue with the notion that males are simply 
"irrational" when battering their intimate partners. See M. Crawford & R. 
Gartner, supra note 3 at 28. 
30 See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text. 
31 As described by the intake officer at Halifax Family Court. See Interview 
with S. Osborne, supra note 27. 
32 Ibid. It is unclear what recourse a judge has at this point. Presumably, the 
breach of such a verbal undertaking will weigh against the defendant in the 
subsequent hearing on the merits. 
33 See e.g. R. v. Collin, (1986) 4 Q.A.C. 215, where the defendant stabbed and 
killed his mistress and her five-year old son five days after she separated from 
him and laid a peace bond information against him; similarly, in April of 1992, 
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trying to separate, and again for bringing their partners to court. 
Bringing an application for a peace bond may in these circumstances 
thus ironically provoke further violence. It would seem ludicrous if 
the courts were to deny women interim protection given this reality. 
Some judges nevertheless seem unperturbed by this irony and refuse 
to consider any evidence or argument in support of conditional 
release at a first hearing of a peace bond.34 
Other advantages to Family Court proceedings noted by pro-
ponents of this route for domestic-related criminal matters include: 
the desirability of keeping all civil and criminal proceedings 
relating to the same family in one court; and the importance of 
recognizing the uniqueness of the victim-offender relationship in 
order to single out domestic violence for the special attention it 
merits.35 
On the other hand, as a Standing Committee on wife battering 
reported in 1982: 
[T]he prosecution of domestic violence cases in the 
Family Court does have certain inherent disadvantages. 
The mere assignment of these crimes to a non-criminal 
court suggests that wife assault is not a criminal offence. 36 
While the Committee left this issue open for further study, more 
recent research would seem to indicate that the Family Court is 
still the best forum for hearing domestic criminal matters. Linda 
MacLeod's 1987 study, Battered But Not Beaten,37 for example, 
found that 
Paul Joseph Halnuck of New Waterford, Nova Scotia stabbed his estranged wife 
Lorraine Mills to death hours after she had applied for a peace bond (Canadian 
Press, 5 November 1993). 
34 In response to my request for an undertaking on behalf of my client in 
Halifax Provincial Court, Judge Hughes Randall summarily replied, "I don't 
do that in my court." An argument that the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, in R. v. 
Wakelin (1992), 71 C.C.C. (3d) 115, had done so was equally unpersuasive. As a 
result, my client, whose time at a crisis shelter was about to expire, was left 
without any preventive protections before her hearing on the merits, which was 
set some four months later. 
35 Ontario, Standing Committee on Social Development, First Report on 
Family Violence: Wife Battering([Toronto]: The Committee, [1982)) at 19-20. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Supra note 6. 
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women are most positive about criminal justice interven-
tion when the criminal justice system is seen as preventive 
and protective, rather than punitive. 38 
Moreover, MacLeod's study observed that, for most battered 
women, the notion of preventive intervention is a broad one, often 
extending beyond traditional legal remedies and notions of justice 
to include a component of counselling for the batterer. Family 
Courts are generally better prepared to adopt this sort of pro-active 
role than are the criminal courts. 
2. Restrictive Statutory Definitions and Intake Policies 
One barrier to proceeding with a peace bond in Family Court or to 
obtaining relief under restraining order provisions found in some 
provincial family law statutes may arise through restrictive defini-
tions of the terms "spouse" or "husband" or "wife" employed in 
provincial Family Law legislation. In Ontario's Family Law Act,39 
for example, the definition of a spouse includes only married cou-
ples or common-law couples who have cohabited "continuously for a 
period of not less than three years"40 or "in a relationship of some 
permanence if they are the natural or adoptive parents of a child" ;41 
women who do not meet these criteria are denied relief against 
their partners under the Act's restraining order provisions.42 In Nova 
Scotia, sections 7(2) and 7(3) of the Family Court Act43 allow for 
38 Ibid. at 85. 
39 s.o. 1986, c. 4. 
40 Ibid., s. 29(a). 
41 Ibid., s. 29(b). 
42 Section 46(1) reads: 
On application, a court may make an interim or final order 
restraining the applicant's spouse from molesting, annoying, or 
harassing the applicant or children in the applicant's lawful 
custody, or from communicating with the applicant or 
children, except as the order provides, and may require the 
applicant's spouse or former spouse to enter into the 
recognizance that the court considers appropriate [emphasis 
added]. 
In contrast, British Columbia's Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 121, 
permits a order to be made against "any person" [emphasis added] restraining 
them from "molesting, annoying, harassing or communicating" or attempting to 
do the same with an applicant. 
43 R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 159. 
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Family Court jurisdiction in peace bond proceedings where the 
parties are a "husband or wife," including 
a man and woman who, although not married to each 
other, have lived together as husband and wife for a pe-
riod of not less than one year. 44 
Excluded from this definition then-and thus also from initiating 
peace bond proceedings in Family Court-are any women whose 
relationships for one reason or another do not qualify as "husband or 
wife," or women who have not yet lived together with their partners 
for one year. 
Court intake policies may further restrict access to peace bond 
hearings in some Family Courts. Halifax Family Court, for exam-
ple, will only accept those applicants who have lived in a 
relationship as "husband and wife" for one year and have not been 
separated from their common-law spouses for more than one year 
immediately preceding the laying of a s. 810 information. 45 This 
second requirement, it should be noted, has no statutory basis46 and 
is thus really an arbitrary policy decision on the part of the court to 
set intake limits. 
Unfortunately, such policies can have absurd results. Thus my 
client, for example, was refused permission to apply in Family 
Court for a peace bond against her former common-law spouse-
even though she had at one time lived with him for over fifteen years 
and had had three children with him-merely because the two had 
been separated for over one year at the time of application. As a 
result, she was forced to go to provincial criminal court, where her 
hearing on the merits was set some four months from the date she 
first applied and no interim protection was granted.47 Her 
application for custody, on the other hand, was permitted to pro-
ceed in Family court. 
44 Ibid., s. 7(2). 
45 Note also that intake officers and justices of the peace will not accept 
informations in relation to threats or incidents of violence if these have not 
occurred within the six month limitation for summary conviction offences [s. 
786(2) of the Criminal Code] immediately prior to the laying of the 
information. 
46 S. 7(2) places no qualification on common-law spouses other than they have 
to have lived together as husband and wife for one year. 
47 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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This sort of fragmentation of proceedings is clearly one addi-
tional barrier that battered women do not need placed in their way. 
The question one might ask is why any woman, who has at any point 
in her life been in an intimate relationship with a violent man, 
should not be allowed to apply for protective relief in Family 
Court where, on balance, such issues are more efficiently and 
carefully addressed. This is especially true when the relationship has 
produced children and the parties are held together by some sort of 
access arrangement. Court intake policies and the various legislative 
definitions of a spouse and/or husband and wife need to be 
rethought to ensure that all battered women have access to peace 
bonds and/or restraining orders in Family Court if they so desire. 
3. Procedural Delays and the Inconsistent Availability of Interim 
Protective Relief 
There is perhaps no single matter of greater concern to battered 
women who decide to seek protection from their assailants than that 
they receive it without delay. As one author notes: 
The timing of orders is critical. Studies of wife beating 
hypothesize a "cycle of violence." In order to prevent fur-
ther beatings which are part of the cycle, immediate help 
may be necessary.48 
Although crisis shelters across the country are providing one es-
sential component of this protection, women seeking the additional 
preventive protection of a peace bond are often met with a variety 
of procedural delays. 
These delays can be both systemic and discretionary in nature. 
Systemic delays, due to high court case loads, are perhaps to some 
degree unavoidable in busy jurisdictions. Nonetheless, court intake 
officers or justices of the peace have significant discretionary power 
in deciding how soon a peace bond application will first be heard. 49 
This decision may depend on a number of factors, including the 
degree of urgency accorded the situation by the individual doing 
48 Grau, supra note 20 at 728. 
49 At Halifax Family Court, the intake officer informs me that she will 
normally schedule a first hearing for a peace bond within seven to ten days from 
the date the information is laid, depending on where the defendant lives. At 
provincial court, on the other hand, my client was initially offered a first 
hearing several weeks after swearing her information and it was only after I 
insisted that this would not do that we were given an earlier date. 
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the intake and his or her perception generally of the importance of 
peace bonds. In the busier criminal courts, there is a tendency to 
ratchet up the relatively low threshold test for the swearing of a s. 
810 information (that is, "any person who fears that another person 
will cause personal injury to him [sic]"), most likely in order to 
reduce case load.50 Thus my client, for example, in trying to lay her 
information was asked rather skeptically by the justice of the peace 
whether she "was afraid for her life." Besides being plainly wrong, 
this sort of question trivializes the experience of many women who 
have been the victims of spousal violence and may result in turning-
away many legitimate peace bond applicants.51 
Those applicants who do succeed in laying a s. 810 information 
are faced with another problem. Where a defendant in as. 810 pro-
ceeding arrives at the first hearing without counsel and/or contests 
the information, the procedure ordinarily followed by the courts is 
to adjourn the proceedings to a future date for the hearing on the 
merits. This procedure, which is simply that routinely followed for 
summary conviction proceedings, raises several issues. One must 
question, first, both the appropriateness and necessity of a two-stage 
approach in view of the delay this causes. Given the significantly 
disproportionate interests potentially at stake-namely, the interest 
of an informant to have immediate protection from harassment, as-
sault and even death, versus the interest of a defendant not to be 
unfairly restricted in his liberty to communicate with or contact the 
informant-one might argue that the ordinarily rigorous procedural 
and constitutional safeguards in place for "accuseds" in other 
Criminal Code proceedings should be relaxed in favour of a more 
expedited peace bond process. 
This argument is supported by the language of s. 810 and the 
unique nature of peace bond proceedings: unlike other provisions of 
the Criminal Code, s. 810 does not create an "offence" in respect to 
h . h " d" b " h d " " . d " " d" 52 w ic an accuse can e c arge , conv1cte , or sen-tence ; 
50 The Ontario Standing Committee on Social Development in its report on 
Wife Battering, found that some justices of the peace have in the past refused to 
accept charges brought by women and instead have encouraged them "to go away 
and think about the matter for a few days," under the assumption that they will 
eventually reconcile with their partners. See supra note 35 at 18. 
5 I Before first coming to see me, my client had gone once to provincial 
criminal court but had been turned away after being told that her case did not 
merit the attention of a prosecutor. 
52 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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s. 810 proceedings, moreover, are arguably not like other criminal 
code prosecutions-the better judicial interpretation is that they are 
"hearings" and not "trials";53 the burden of proof is that on a balance 
of probabilities and not beyond a reasonable doubt;54 and, the 
ordinarily strict rules of evidence do not apply.55 Although under s. 
810(3) a justice can commit a defendant to prison for up to twelve 
months if he fails or refuses to enter into the recognizance, this 
power must be viewed in light of the potential gravity of the threats 
or fears warranting an order for a peace bond in the first place. 
These unique features imply a different, perhaps more flexible, 
approach to be followed in peace bond proceedings than that fol-
lowed otherwise under the Criminal Code;56 when viewed alongside 
the purpose of the section-that being, to prevent the commission of 
a future harm-that approach should be one of proceeding without 
delay. This might mean, for example, that, where both parties are 
present at the first hearing, a court should make every effort to 
proceed with the merits of the information without adjourning 
unless there are some compelling reasons for so doing. One notes in 
this regard that under s. 803(1) adjournments in summary 
conviction proceedings are discretionary and are not to exceed "eight 
clear days unless both parties or their counsel or agents consent to 
the proposed adjournment." This section suggests that adjournments 
are not to be granted as a matter of course. In order to ensure that 
the parties are prepared to proceed as quickly and fairly as possible, 
however, advance notice could be given, perhaps at the time the 
information is laid or when the summons is served, regarding the 
nature of the proceeding and the need to be prepared to present 
evidence when first appearing in court. 
53 See R. v. Manette, supra note 12, per Cacchione, Co. Ct. J. 
54 Millerv. Miller (1991), 87 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 250 (Nfld. Prov. Ct.) at 255 
[hereinafter Miller]. 
55 Patrick, supra note 12. In Patrick, Ryan, Co. Ct. J. argued that evidence of 
disposition or propensity of an accused, not normally admissible in criminal 
trials, was admissible in a s. 810 hearing because the rationale for excluding such 
evidence-undermining the presumption of innocence-had less significance in 
peace bond proceedings which by their nature sought to predict and prevent the 
commission of crime. 
56 In Miller, supra note 54, for example, Handrigan, P.C.J. took note of what he 
called the "quasi-criminal" character of s. 810 to argue that the degree of proof in 
a section 810 hearing was not beyond a reasonable doubt as in true criminal 
proceedings, but rather on a balance of probabilities. 
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Interestingly, there would seem to be no such notice requirement 
at common law when binding an individual over to the peace. In R. 
v. Woking,57 the English Court of Appeal held that a defendant, who 
is before a judge on a charge and is acquitted of that charge, can be 
bound over to keep the peace without being given notice of the 
judge's intention to do so. The court distinguished the situation of 
the defendant from a witness, observing: 
By contrast, the defendant comes before the court know-
ing that allegations are to be made against him, knowing 
that he can be represented if appropriate, and knowing 
that he can call evidence if he wishes. It seems to me that 
a rule which requires a witness to be warned of the pos-
sibility of a binding-over should not necessarily apply to 
a defendant in that different position.58 
Canadian courts have divided over Woking and whether the absence 
of notice and the opportunity to make submissions where a judge 
imposes a common law peace bond amounts to a denial of natural 
justice. In R. v. White, Ex Parte Chohan,59 Re Regina and Shaber/>0 
and Re Compton and the Queer/>1 the courts found that it did. More 
recent cases, including a 1984 decision from the Ontario High 
Court of Justice, Re Broomes,62 have held the opposite.63 Moreover, 
Broomes and Woking were cited with approval by Lamer, C.J.C 
(dissenting, on other grounds) in the recent Supreme Court of 
Canada decision R. v. Parks.64 
Where an adjournment is granted, the question which arises is, 
can a court order some form of interim protection for the infor-
mant? This issue came squarely before the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal in the recent case R. v. Wakelin.65 In Wake/in, the defendant 
had been named in a s. 810 peace bond information after threatening 
to kill the informant. At his first appearance before a justice of the 
peace he was released after executing an undertaking not to 
57 [1973] 2 All E.R. 621 (C.A.) [hereinafter Woking]. 
58 Ibid. at 623. 
59 (1969), 1 C.C.C. 19 (B.C.S.C.). 
60 (1972), 8 C.C.C. (2d) 422 (Ont. H.C.J.). 
6! (1979), 42 C.C.C. (2d) 163 (B.C.S.C.). 
62 (1984), 12 C.C.C. (3d) 220 (Ont. H.C.J.) [hereinafter Broomes]. 
63 See Stevenson, supra note 14. 
64 (1992), 75 C.C.C. (3d) 287 (S.C.C.). 
65 (1992), 71 C.C.C. (3d) 115 (Sask. C.A.) [hereinafter Wake/in]. 
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communicate with the informant pursuant to the judicial interim 
release provisions in s. 515. Before the peace bond hearing was held, 
Wakelin breached this undertaking and was charged under s. 145(3) 
with failure to comply with a condition in an undertaking. At trial, 
he was acquitted on the grounds that the judicial interim release 
provisions could not be applied to a person who is the subject of a 
peace bond proceeding. 
On appeal, however, this decision was overturned: Jackson, J.A. 
held that a judge could order the release of a person named in a s. 
810 information on an undertaking pursuant to s. 515. In arriving at 
this conclusion, the court observed: 
Section 810(5) incorporates by reference all of the provi-
sions relating to summary conviction offences generally. 
Section 795 makes the provisions of Part XVI [which in-
cludes judicial interim release] apply to summary 
conviction offences "with such modifications as the 
circumstances require." Part XVI refers throughout to an 
"accused." It is reasonable to conclude that a required 
modification to make to section 515 to make it applica-
ble to section 810 is to read "accused" in section 515 as 
including a person against whom an information has been 
laid under section 81Q.66 
Jackson, J.A. considered but refused to follow the reasoning of the 
British Columbia Supreme Court in R. v. Forrest 67 where it was 
held that a defendant in a s. 810 proceeding is not an "accused 
charged with an offence" as referred to ins. 515(1) and thus cannot 
be released under this section. Instead, she relied on the decision R. 
v. Allen,68 where the Ontario Court of Appeal used an argument 
similar to her own to find that a warrant for arrest under Part XVI 
could be issued under s. 810, even though this section does not create 
an offence. On the strength of Allen, the British Columbia Supreme 
Court has itself since declined to follow Forrest in the case R. v. 
Chester.69 
Wake/in, Allen, and Chester provide solid legal authority for ar-
guing that the judicial interim release provisions apply to the 
release of defendants in a s. 810 proceeding. Such defendants in 
66 Ibid. at 121. 
67 (1983), 8 C.C.C. (3d) 444 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter Forrest]. 
68 (1985), 18 C.C.C. (3d) 155 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter Allen]. 
69 Supranote 14. 
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other words can be made to sign undertakings not to communicate 
or have any contact with their victims. Judges thus do have the power 
to provide interim protective relief for women while they await the 
peace bond hearing itself. The sense of relief and empowerment this 
provides battered women cannot be underestimated. 7o Lawyers 
representing battered women in peace bond proceedings should 
therefore be prepared to "show cause" when first appearing on a s. 
810 information as in any other bail hearing; by the same token 
judges should be prepared to hear the evidence so presented and 
place defendants under appropriate undertakings if cause is shown. 
II. SUBSTANTIVE AND EVIDENTIARY OBSTACLES 
At a hearing of as. 810(1) information, two important requirements 
must be met before a peace bond will be ordered: an informant 
must adduce sufficient evidence to satisfy the court that she has 
reasonable grounds to fear the other person will cause personal injury 
to her (or her child). ] udicial interpretation of s. 810 has not 
produced any clear or consistent understanding of how these two 
requirements are to be met. In particular, two key issues remain un-
resolved: 
1. What is the standard of proof in a peace bond proceeding? 
2. What sort of conduct qualifies to trigger the requirment in 
s. 810(1) that an informant fear that someone will cause her 
"personal injury"? Is this fear assessed solely on an objective 
basis, or on a more subjective one? 
I. The Standard of Proof 
Section 810(3) provides that a justice may order a defendant to en-
ter into a recognizance to keep the peace with or without conditions 
"if satisfied by the evidence adduced that the informant has reason-
able grounds for [her] fears" [emphasis added]. While there appears 
to be no disagreement that the informant bears the burden of proof 
in as. 810(3) hearing, it is less certain on what standard this burden 
is to be met. Some courts have held that s. 810 hearings are no dif-
ferent from other criminal proceedings and that standard of proof 
70 I base this statement on observing the response of my client when she was 
denied this procedure. 
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must therefore be beyond a reasonable doubt.71 By contrast, other 
courts have argued that the standard of proof is that on a balance of 
probabilities, or, in any event, less than that for "true" criminal pro-
ceedings. 72 
The uncertainty over this issue and some of the underlying 
competing arguments are best illustrated in the judgement of 
Halvorson, J. in Stevenson v. Saskatchewan (Minister of ]ustice):73 
It was not argued before me, and I need not decide the 
nature of the standard of proof contemplated under sec-
tion 745 [nows. 810]. The section specifies that the judge 
must be satisfied that the complainant had reasonable 
grounds for fear. The trial judge construed that onus to be 
beyond a reasonable doubt. If he was correct then the 
burden of proof under [s. 810] would be more onerous 
than under the common law preventive justice juris-
diction. As this proceeding was commenced by informa-
tion under the summary conviction part of the Criminal 
Code, it is arguable that proof of allegation must be be-
yond a reasonable doubt. However, if it is so that a con -
viction does not result when an accused is bonded under 
[s. 81 O], then it could be contended the burden of proof is 
less than beyond a reasonable doubt. Support for this 
latter position may be found in the fact that [s. 810] is at 
least a partial codification of the common law preventive 
justice principle which did not require proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 74 
As Halvorson, J. points out, the argument that s. 810 hearings 
must be held to the ordinary "criminal" standard of proof rests 
primarily on the notion that s. 810 proceedings are no different 
from any other proceedings under the Criminal Code. Defendants in 
peace bond proceedings must thus be accorded all the rights of an 
7l See e.g. R. v. Charles English (1984), 12 W.C.B. 405 (Ont. Prov. Ct.) 
[hereinafter Charles English]; Regina v. Ruey Kuang Lin (1984), 13 W.C.B. 261 
(B.C. Prov. Ct.); and R v. Kirkham, [1993] O.J. No. 1618 (QL). 
72 See Miller, supra note 54. Stevenson, supra note 14, while not deciding one 
way or the other, leans in favour of a burden less onerous than beyond a reasonable 
doubt. See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
73 Supra note 14. 
74 Ibid at 94. 
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accused in an ordinary trial. In R. v. Kirkham,75 for example, 
Salhany, J. argues: 
It is necessary to repeat that it is been long settled that 
the onus in all criminal cases, even one involving a pro-
ceeding under section 810 of the Criminal Code, is that 
there must always be proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 76 
A similar explanation was given by Caney, Prov. Ct. J. in 
Charles English:77 where the matter is one of criminal law, the onus is 
upon the Crown to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the alle-
gation contained in the information.78 
Clearly, however, as discussed earlier a strong argument could 
be put that hearings under s. 810 are substantially different from 
other proceedings under the Criminal Code and the standard of 
proof must thus also be different. As Halvorson, J. in Stevenson 
suggests, s. 810's non-punitive nature and link with the common-law 
power of "preventive justice" militate against the application of the 
normal criminal standard in peace bond proceedings. Perhaps even 
more persuasive, however, are the reasons provided by Handrigan, 
Prov. Ct. J. in Miller in holding that the standard of proof under s. 
810 was on a balance of probabilities: 
1. Proceedings under section 810 are at best quasi-crimi-
nal in nature and even where there is a finding that the 
accused is required to enter into a recognizance this is not 
a conviction and no penalty flows directly there from. 
2. The wording of section 810 of the Criminal Code is 
to the effect that an application can be taken out by any 
person "who fears," and that the court must be satisfied on 
the evidence adduced that the applicant has "reasonable 
grounds for his fears." The use of the words "fears," 
"satisfied," and "reasonable grounds" do [sic] not suggest 
the same severity or significant degree of proof attendant 
upon the prosecution in bona fide criminal proceedings. 
3. While it may be argued that a respondent entering into 
a recognizance has his liberty restricted, or that a very 
75 (1993] O.J. No. 1618 (QL) [hereinafter Kirkham]. 
76 Ibid. at para. 3. 
77 Supra note 71. 
78 Ibid. 
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real consequence will result to those directed to but who 
refuse to enter into a recognizance, essentially the 
existence of a recognizance is no penalty or burden for a 
respondent to bear, simply because he is only binding 
himself to do what all law-abiding citizens are required 
to do. It is true that he attracts the risks of further penalty 
for breaching the peace or failing to be of good behaviour 
but this is not such an unreasonable burden or expectation 
for him, such that his exposure to it should be sup portable 
only by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
4. The recognizance contemplated by section 810 of the 
Criminal Code may be in form 32 of the Criminal Code 
and this is the type of form suggested as being the form 
of a recognizance to be entered into by a person released 
by the court under the judicial interim release provisions 
of the Criminal Code. It is a well established fact that the 
burden on the applicant under the judicial interim release 
provisions is not beyond a reasonable doubt but on a bal-
ance of probabilities. Hence, it would follow a fortiori 
that the burden contemplated by section 810 of the 
Criminal Code is on the same standard, proof on a balance 
of probabilities. 79 
The purpose, language and effect of s. 810, as Handrigan notes, 
differ markedly from most other Criminal Code proceedings. All 
three point to a lower standard of proof to be applied in the adjudi-
cation of peace bond informations. While it is true that the liberty 
of the defendant is affected by as. 810 order, this effect is in most 
circumstances a peripheral one and should not be viewed in the ab-
stract. One must weigh, in other words, the interests of an informant 
to be free from the threat of personal injury with those of a 
defendant to be free from any restrictions on his liberty, however 
insignificant. Stated another way, one must compare the risk of fu-
ture harm faced by an informant with the risk of unjustly placing 
restrictions on a defendant's freedom of movement or communi-
cation. Such an awareness of the interests at stake is even more cru-
79 Miller, supra note 54 at 255. Note also, that one court has previously held that 
the standard of proof under s. 98( 6) of the Criminal Code, which permits the court 
to make an order prohibiting the possession of firearms if "satisfied that there 
are reasonable grounds to believe that it is not desirable in the interests of safety" 
[emphasis added], was less than that for ordinary criminal proceedings. See R. v. 
Anderson (1981), 59 C.C.C. (2d) 439 (Ont. Co. Ct.) at 449 [hereinafter Anderson]. 
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cial in the context of violence against women-the context appli-
cable to most peace bond proceedings today80-where there is a 
proven threat of future violence. 81 Lowering the standard of proof in 
peace bond proceedings is merely recognizing that the traditional 
imbalance of risk in a criminal trial is not at play in a s. 810 
hearing. 
Cases like Kirkham and Charles English, however, indicate that 
for many judges the standard of proof in a peace bond proceeding is 
unequivocally beyond a reasonable doubt. On the other hand, 
Stevenson, Miller, and perhaps to a lesser extent Anderson, 32 provide 
counsel with some authority to argue that the ordinary criminal 
standard of proof should not be applied in a s. 810 hearing. 
2. The Meaning "Personal Injury" and "Reasonable Grounds" 
Before a judge will order a defendant to enter into a peace bond 
under s. 810(3), she or he must be satisfied that the informant has 
"reasonable grounds" to fear that the defendant will cause her (or her 
children) "personal injury."83 While the law is dear that the meaning 
of "personal injury" extends to any reasonable apprehension of 
physical harm, 84 it is less certain whether psychological harm or other 
forms of harassment85 will also qualify as personal injury. 
Equally ambiguous under s. 810(3) is whether the fear of 
"personal injury" an informant must demonstrate is to be assessed 
on a purely objective basis or according to some 
80 Of the 37 peace bond judgements I read where I could dearly identify the 
gender of the parties and the nature of the conflict, thirty (81 %) of them involved 
a woman seeking protection against a man, usually a spouse; four (11 %) involved 
a man seeking a bond against another male; and one (2.7%) involved a man 
seeking protection from a woman-of the other two, one was sought against a 
company and the other by a family against a son. 
8l See supra note 6 and accompanying text, with respect to the increased risk of 
harm for battered women who separate from and begin legal action against their 
spouses. 
82 Supra note 79. 
83 Note, however, that some justices of the peace will sometimes unjustifiably 
take on this role to a certain degree themselves. See supra note 50 and 
accompanying text. 
84 See Regina v. Francis Balfour (1984), 13 W.C.B. 277 (B.C. Prov. Ct.) 
[hereinafter Balfour]. 
85 Note that Parliament has recently passed amendments to the Criminal Code 
with respect to "stalkers" or persons who repeatedly harass others: Bill C-126, 
adding s. 264 to the Criminal Code. 
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subjective/objective mix. Must the judge alone believe there are 
reasonable grounds for the informant's fears, or is it sufficient that 
the informant herself has reasonable grounds for her fears? The 
distinction is important as what a judge believes is reasonable may 
not seem reasonable to the informant. In fact, as some of the more 
notorious examples of judicial bias and sexism emphasize, what a 
judge believes may be patently unreasonable.86 
In Regina v. Francis Balfour,87 a B.C. provincial court judge ex-
amined both the issue of personal injury and on what basis such in-
juries would be assessed. In Balfour the defendant had verbally 
abused his estranged wife but had never used physical violence 
against her. In rejecting the informant's request for a peace bond, 
Collings, Prov. Ct. J. held that only the reasonable apprehension of 
physical violence could be the subject of a s. 810 order. Collings, 
Prov. Ct. J. further argued that, as s. 810(3) imposed an objective 
standard, whether or not the informant herself was scared was not the 
focus of inquiry; rather the question was whether a "reasonable 
impartial bystander" would fear physical harm. 
Balfours harshly objective "reasonable impartial bystander" test 
may have been softened somewhat, however, in two recent cases, also 
out of British Columbia. In Patrick,88 the County Court held, inter 
alia, that the examination of what constitutes "reasonable grounds" 
for fear includes an inquiry into the informant's belief as to the 
accused's propensity for causing injury. Similarly, in R. v. Nelitz,89 
the test articulated by Smith, Prov. Ct. J. was thus: 
A reasonable person placed in the position of [the infor-
mant] must be able to conclude there were reasonable 
ground for her fears [emphasis added]. 
In Nelitz, the informant had been followed around and pestered by 
the defendant, a stranger, but he had never threatened or physically 
harmed her. Smith, Prov. Ct. J. refused to decide whether the 
meaning of personal injury included the type of psychological in-
jury being inflicted here on the informant; instead, the judge re-
ferred to Parliament's new anti-stalking legislation and concluded 
86 See supra note 28. 
87 Supra note 84. 
88 Supra note 12. 
89 [1993] B.C.J. No. 1207 (Q.L.) [hereinafter Nelitz]. 
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that a reasonable person in the informant's situation would fear per-
sonal injury. 
Neither Nelitz nor Patrick follows a strict interpretation of 
Balfour where the test for personal injury was based solely on threats 
of physical harm as assessed from the perspective of a purely objec-
tive bystander. Instead these cases have allowed a measure of sub-
jectivity to ground a legitimate claim under s. 810. This approach, 
it should be noted, is in tune with the Supreme Court of Canada's 
decision in Lavalleev. R.90 wherein Wilson, J. stated (with respect to 
battered women and self-defence): 
The issue is not ... what an outsider would have reason -
ably perceived but what the accused [here, the battered 
woman] reasonably perceived, given her situation and her 
experience. 91 
Nelitz, furthermore, may have impliedly extended the meaning of 
"personal injury" to include some degree of harassment or psycho-
logical injury. This is a welcome shift for battered women, who of-
ten have difficulty speaking about or remembering with any detail 
the physical harm they have endured.92 
Nevertheless, Balfour indicates that many judges will still re-
quire a reasonable apprehension of physical violence assessed on a 
purely objective basis in order to grant relief under s. 810. Nelitz 
and Patrick are two cases that counsel can employ to counter this 
restrictive approach. 
III. CONCLUSIONS 
In this comment I have attempted to expose some of the problems 
faced by battered women who attempt to secure a peace bond under 
s. 810 of the Criminal Code. While it is impossible to put an exact 
figure to the problem, studies indicate that the number of women 
denied access to, or who are put off obtaining, a peace bond may be 
substantial.93 This comment has pointed to some of the procedural 
90 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852. 
91 Ibid. at 883. 
92 My client, for example, had a great deal of difficulty speaking about the 
physical abuse she had suffered and often would forget specific incidents of 
physical violence in the past. See also Macleod, supra note 6 at 11-18. 
93 See Grau, supra note 20. 
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and substantive obstacles that may unfairly stand in the way of an 
informant who seeks the protection of s. 810. In particular, I have 
noted the problems caused by procedural delays and the 
inconsistent application of interim protection via the judicial in-
terim release provisions of the Criminal Code. I have furthermore 
argued that, as a s. 810 hearing is significantly different in purpose 
and nature than other "true" criminal proceedings, the courts should 
not apply the normal standard of proof. Finally, the courts should 
similarly avoid an overly restrictive and objective assessment of 
what constitutes a reasonable fear of "personal injury." 
While there are, of course, many broader sociological reasons 
why women may be put off initiating peace bond proceedings,94 as 
one researcher rightly observes: 
To assist victims of abuse who have traditionally been 
deterred from pursuing legal recourse because of the 
intimidating and cumbersome nature of the criminal 
process, restraining orders should be readily available 
and easy to obtain. Ready access to restraining orders 
reassures victims who may be wary of pursuing legal 
action.95 
Providing ready access to peace bonds will ensure that this rem-
edy stays true to its function of "preventive justice" and will not it-
self be "preventing justice." 
94 There may be a variety of reasons why women decide not to pursue or give up 
pursuing restraining type orders, including the cost of legal fees where aid is 
unavailable; a lack of information or education with respect to court and peace 
bond proceedings; the fear that violence will increase if peace bond proceedings 
are commenced; or a tendency on the part of the women victims to assume some 
blame or responsibility for the violence perpetrated against them by their spouses 
or partners. See Brown, supra note 18 at 262-63. 
95 Ibid. at 263. 
